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I. PREFACE AND SUMMARY 
“Price Tag,” also known as “Arvut Hadadit” (Mutual Responsibil-
ity), is a set of violent tactics employed by national-religious Israeli settlers 
in the West Bank to deter Israeli law enforcement authorities from removing 
illegally-built structures from West Bank settlements.1 The tactics employed 
include attacks on Palestinians and their property, as well as attacks on Is-
raeli military and police officers. These tactics are designed to obstruct and 
deter law enforcement inside settlements, but their ultimate goal is to deter 
Israeli leaders from implementing a possible future Israeli-Palestinian peace 
agreement that entails removing Israeli settlements from the West Bank.  
This essay describes how a strategy that started as a reaction to a 
sense of powerlessness and ineptness morphed from an unpopular form of 
high-profile, anti-government resistance into a popular—and very effec-
tive—low-intensity anti-Palestinian terrorism campaign.  
By tweaking their tactics and using them in a determined yet con-
trolled manner, its perpetrators—young militant national-religious Jewish 
settlers in the West Bank—have been successful in achieving two major 
objectives: first, they have deterred Israeli authorities from enforcing the 
  
  Ori Nir is the Spokesperson of Americans for Peace Now. He was the Washington 
bureau chief of Israel’s Haaretz daily and of the Forward. He has covered Palestinian affairs 
for Haaretz through the First Intifada and through the implementation of the first phases of 
the Oslo Agreement. Nir also covered Jewish-Arab relations in Israel for Haaretz through the 
first years of the Second Intifada.   
 1 Isabel Kershner, Arsonists Damage and Deface Mosque in West Bank Village, N. Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2011, at A6 (describing the vandalism of a West Bank mosque as part of the 
“price tag” strategy). 
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law and demolishing illegally-constructed buildings in West Bank settle-
ments; second, they have done so without alienating an overwhelming ma-
jority of Israelis. 
This essay documents the success of a form of terrorism unique in 
Western experience: politically-motivated violence directed against a foe, 
with the primary purpose of deterring the terrorists’ own government from 
taking actions against their community.  
II. INCEPTION OF PRICE TAG 
The adoption of the “Price Tag” policy by settlers is rooted in a 
trauma experienced by the settler movement in 2005: Israel’s August 2005 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from four northern West Bank settle-
ments.2 Before explaining the significance of that trauma, some background 
is necessary to understand who the players are and the political context in 
which they have acted.  
The West Bank and the Gaza Strip came under Israeli military oc-
cupation in 1967, following the Six Day War.3 The West Bank is today 
home to some 2.5 million Palestinians and 305,000 Israeli settlers.4 The 
settlers live in 121 officially recognized settlements (not including East Je-
rusalem).5 These settlements are officially recognized, in the sense that they 
were constructed with Israeli government authorization. Most of the world’s 
governments regard all Jewish settlements in the occupied territories as ille-
gal.6 In addition to these “recognized” settlements, some settlers live in 
about one hundred illegal (under Israeli law) “outposts.”7 These are small 
communities built without Israeli government approval.  
  
 2 See David Khalfa, After the Gaza Withdrawal: Settlers' Struggle over the Meaning of 
the Israeli National Identity, in CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS AND PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE 
STATE OF ISRAEL: MOBILIZATION AROUND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 42 (Elisabeth 
Marteu ed., 2009) (attributing the genesis of “price tag” to hardline settlers aiming to make 
disengagement from the West Bank extremely costly for Israeli policymakers). 
 3 See E.C. Hodgkin, The West Bank Occupation, in PALESTINE: A SEARCH FOR TRUTH: 
APPROACHES TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 180 (Alan R. Taylor & Richard N. Tetlie eds., 
1970) (indicating that the West Bank had been under Israeli military occupation for two and 
a half years as of publication). 
 4 The World Factbook: West Bank, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html (providing an extensive database of 
demographic and statistical information regarding the West Bank) (last updated Sept. 27, 
2011). 
 5 Palestinians Shun Israeli Settlement Restriction Plan, BBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8379868.stm (providing a useful table of West Bank 
background data updated through late 2009).  
 6 See Ethan Bronner, In Israel, Time for Peace Offer May Run Out, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 
2011, at A1 (noting that international condemnation of the Jewish settlements is universal).  
 7 Palestinians Shun Israeli Settlement Restriction Plan, supra note 5.  
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The Gaza Strip is home to over 1,650,000 Palestinians.8 Until 2005, 
there were also 8,600 Israeli settlers living in twenty-one settlements in the 
Gaza Strip.9 In September 2005, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon led a 
sweeping, historical campaign to unilaterally “disengage” from the Gaza 
Strip.10 He withdrew all of the Israeli settlers and all of Israel’s military in-
stallations from the Strip. In addition, the Sharon government removed four 
small settlements in the northern West Bank. Today, Sharon is remembered 
as the Israeli leader who once (in the 1980s and 1990s) was the chief spon-
sor and advocate of the settlement enterprise, and then later became the first 
Israeli leader to start its dismantlement.  
In 2003, Israel accepted the U.S.-sponsored “Road Map” plan to re-
start Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. The plan stipulated that all Israe-
li illegal outposts that were constructed after 2001 would be promptly dis-
mantled. In 2005, the government passed a resolution stating that Israel was 
committed to dismantling these outposts.11 As the U.S. government made 
efforts to resume peace negotiations under Presidents Bush and Obama, it 
put pressure on three successive Israeli governments (led by Ariel Sharon, 
Ehud Olmert and Binyamin Netanyahu, respectively) to make good on Isra-
el’s Road Map commitment. Indeed, at several points since 2005, ruling 
Israeli governments issued demolition orders against illegally-built struc-
tures in settlements and outposts, and moved to implement them.  
This essay discusses the reaction of a particular segment of the set-
tlers’ population to the demolitions and to threats of demolition. Ideologi-
cally-committed, messianic, and national-religious in nature, this segment 
mainly inhabits settlements deep inside the West Bank. Unlike the bulk of 
the settlers, who live in suburban communities adjacent to population cen-
ters inside Israel because of the West Bank’s economic and “quality of life” 
benefits, the so-called “ideological settlers” tend to live in smaller settle-
  
 8 The World Factbook: West Bank, supra note 4 (estimating the Gaza Strip’s population 
at 1,657,155 as of July 2011). 
 9 Donald Macintyre, Historic Exodus from Gaza Begins as 8,500 Settlers Move On, THE 
INDEPENDENT (Aug. 14, 2005), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/histor 
ic-exodus-from-gaza-strip-begins-as-8500-settlers-move-on-502789.html. 
 10 See David Weisburd & Hagit Lernau, What Prevented Violence in the Withdrawal from 
the Gaza Strip: Toward a Perspective of Normative Balance, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
37, 52–53 (2006) (describing the formation of the disengagement policy from Sharon’s ini-
tial proposal to its eventual adoption by the Israeli Knesset). 
 11 Id. at 52 (describing both a parliamentary resolution indicating Israel’s commitment to 
disengagement from the settlements and outposts, as well as a subsequent implementation 
order); see also Exchange of Letters between PM Ariel Sharon and President Bush, ISR. 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. (Apr. 14, 2004), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/ 
Reference+Documents/Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-Apr-2004.htm?Display 
Mode=print (describing the government’s withdrawal plan as a “unilateral disengagement” 
from the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank). 
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ments, in and around biblically significant landmarks. The ideological set-
tlers see themselves as fulfilling a religious edict. This essay will address 
this segment of the settlers’ population. For the sake of simplicity, this essay 
will refer to “ideological settlers” simply as “the settlers.”  
Violent attacks by the settlers against West Bank Palestinians are 
not a new phenomenon. Deadly Palestinian attacks against the settlers are 
not new either. Violent friction has always existed between these popula-
tions, who co-exist in an environment of military occupation. What is 
new—and is the focus of this paper—is the use of violence by the settlers 
not only to influence the behavior of the Palestinians but also, chiefly, to 
influence the behavior of the Israeli government.  
Israel’s August 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from four 
settlements in the northern West Bank, so-called “unilateral disengage-
ment,” or “Gaza disengagement”12 traumatized the settlers in several ways:  
 The settlers’ public perception and self-perception as a paper 
tiger: The eviction of settlers from Gaza—about 8,500 people—lasted 
eight days, and was carried out with mild resistance by the settlers. It was 
anti-climactic.
13
 It followed a protest campaign by settlers and their sym-
pathizers inside Israel that lasted ten months, and included mass demon-
strations and two murderous attacks by Israeli Jewish terrorists against Is-
raeli Arabs and Palestinians, all in an attempt to derail the government’s 
disengagement plan.
14
 The settlers resisted the eviction from Gaza, but 
failed to mobilize a mass civil disobedience campaign or a broad conscien-
tious objection campaign among Israeli soldiers. Israeli law enforcement 
authorities were successful in quickly and efficiently evicting the settlers 
and in dismantling the settlements in Gaza, a feat that deeply alarmed the 
settlers. They were concerned that the precedent would encourage Israeli 
leaders to later withdraw from most—if not all—of the West Bank. 
 The settlers’ failure to capture the hearts and minds of most Israe-
lis: At the time of its implementation, the disengagement was popular. 
Almost two-thirds of Israelis supported it.
15
 Of those who did not, only a 
minority opposed it and did so on the ideological grounds that portions of 
the Land of Israel should not be compromised. 
  
 12 The Disengagement Plan - General Outline, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. (Apr. 18, 
2004), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ (describing the government’s withdrawal plan as a “uni-
lateral disengagement” from the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank).  
 13 See Weisburd & Lernau, supra note 10, at 40 (noting that the violence and civil unrest 
expected to follow the disengagement never fully materialized).  
 14 Id. at 39–40. 
 15 Esther Pan, Q&A: The Gaza Withdrawal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.ny 
times.com/cfr/international/slot2_080805.html?pagewanted=1 (noting that approval for the 
disengagement was consistently between 65–70%, but dropped to 50% immediately preced-
ing withdrawal). 
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 A generational rift between the settlers’ older “traditional” leader-
ship and the young activists: The battle against the disengagement was a 
failure. The intense public relations campaign that the settlers’ traditional 
leaders carried out over the course of almost a year, attempting (in their 
words) to “settle in the hearts” of Israelis, using “positive” slogans such as 
“we have love, and it will triumph,” did not work.
16
 At the conclusion of 
this charm offensive, most Israelis sided with Prime Minister Ariel Sha-
ron’s drive to uproot the settlers from their homes. Sympathy for the set-
tlers was at an all-time low. The young activists accused the traditional 
leaders of creating a situation that would make future withdrawals from 
the West Bank much easier for the government to implement. In fact, 
leaders of Ariel Sharon’s ruling Kadima party were openly talking about 
future plans to withdraw unilaterally from vast parts of the West Bank, up-
rooting thousands of settlers.
17
 Indeed, this was the key plank in the Kadi-
ma party platform in Israel’s March 2006 general elections. Ehud Olmert 
ran on this platform and won.
18
  
Shortly before the elections, in February 2006, the settlers were 
handed an opportunity to change course. The government was preparing to 
enforce the law and demolish several houses at the illegal outpost of 
Amona, not far from the Palestinian town of Ramallah, north of Jerusalem.19 
An illegal outpost is a settlement—typically a small one—built without 
Israeli government authorization, in violation of Israeli law.  
Although the demolition in Amona was of only nine houses (a frac-
tion of the buildings vacated and demolished in the settlements of the Gaza 
Strip several months earlier) the settlers’ leaders prepared for a major con-
frontation.20 Unlike the settlers’ leaders during the disengagement from Ga-
za, the leaders during this time were not of the older generation: rabbis and 
activists who established the settlements in the 1970s and 1980s. The lead-
ers during this resistance were young activists who rejected the rabbis’ reti-
  
 16 See MICHAEL FEIGE, SETTLING IN THE HEARTS: JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 265 (2009) (discussing the varying tactics used to protest the disen-
gagement plan and the subsequent failure to curry public favor).  
 17 See Scott Wilson, Kadima Planning West Bank Pullout, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2006, at 
A9 (discussing Kadima party’s plan to evacuate thousands of Israelis living in scattered West 
Bank settlements).  
 18 See Scott Wilson, Sharon’s Party Is Winner In Israel, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2006, at 
A1 (“The Kadima party led by acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert won the most seats in 
Israel’s parliamentary elections Tuesday, in a vote that hinges on his plan to draw the coun-
try’s final borders through unilateral withdrawals from the Palestinian territories.”). 
 19 See Greg Myre, Settlers in West Bank Outpost Battle Police Who Came to Raze Houses, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at A12 (reporting that police were ordered to tear down houses 
built without permission along the West Bank near Ramallah).  
 20 See id. (discussing the violent confrontation between settlers and policemen). 
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cence in confronting the state establishment.21 Young leaders amassed thou-
sands of activists, also known as “the Hilltop Youth,” who violently clashed 
with a large force of Israeli police officers, pelting the officers with rocks, 
bricks and metal bars. Hundreds of settlers were injured, as well as scores of 
police officers, many more than those injured during the Gaza disengage-
ment, months earlier.22  
The “Hilltop Youth” were not a new phenomenon. Neither was the 
generational crisis within the settler community. Israelis were first intro-
duced more than ten years ago to the “Hilltop Youth”: rogue, young, vio-
lent, extremist settlers, who rejected the Israeli establishment and Israel’s 
mainstream culture, and who rebelled against the settler elders’ alliance 
with the Israeli establishment.23 Before Amona, these young militants were 
disorganized, and had not yet posed a formidable challenge to their elders’ 
leadership.  
The disengagement from Gaza brought the settlers’ ongoing genera-
tional crisis to a peak, and brought the Hilltop Youth to the forefront of the 
Israeli public’s attention.  
The young settlers’ violent conduct in Amona was a direct reaction 
to the Gaza disengagement trauma. At the time, Yuval Diskin, then-chief of 
the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service, said: “the motivation of the 
people in the field was to make up for the disgrace of Gush Katif [the main 
bloc of settlements in Gaza] and to drive a message: Not through love we 
will triumph, but through struggle and war.”24 
At a February 5, 2006 cabinet meeting, Diskin warned the ministers 
that he was witnessing a “process of rift” between the settlers and the state. 
He noted that some of the settlers had carried signs that read: “In war we 
will prevail,” and “It is Jews who build and Israelis who destroy.”25  
Initially, the settlers and their supporters perceived the Amona ex-
perience as a disaster. They came out of it bloodied—both physically and 
figuratively. Violent resistance did not prevent the demolition of the illegal-
ly-built houses in Amona, violent confrontation with Israeli law enforce-
  
 21 INT’L CRISIS GRP., MIDDLE E. REP. NO. 89, ISRAEL’S RELIGIOUS RIGHT AND THE 
QUESTION OF SETTLEMENTS 8 (2009) [hereinafter CRISIS GRP. REP.], available at http://www 
.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/89_i
sraels_religious_right_and_the_question_of_settlements.pdf. 
 22 See Myre, supra note 19 (reporting that over 200 were injured in the West Bank con-
frontation, including police officers, settlers and right-wing members of Parliament). 
 23 See CRISIS GRP. REP., supra note 21 (explaining the development of the moniker 
“Hilltop Youth”). 
 24 Ronny Sofer, Shin Bet: “Extremist Settlers Not Marginal,” YNET NEWS (Feb. 5, 2006), 
www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3211299,0.html. 
 25 See id. (discussing the presence of signs with slogans such as, “In war we will win,” 
among others). 
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ment further alienated the Israeli public, and the rift between their tradition-
al leaders and the young activists deepened.  
With time, however, the perception of Amona as a defeat was trans-
formed. More than a year after the battle, Knesset Member Uri Ariel, one of 
the ideological settlers’ leaders, published an article in the national-religious 
daily Hatzofe headlined “A Defeat That Is All Triumph.” 26  
The main reason for that “triumph” was that the settlers did achieve 
one fundamental goal: for more than a year, they kept Israel’s government 
from carrying out more demolitions at illegal outposts. The government 
knew that any further implementation of demolition orders would cause 
more bloodshed. Internal police probes and other investigations showed that 
much of the bloodshed was a result of police and the army using excessive 
force. 
In his article, MK Ariel wrote: “The fact that since Amona not even 
one outpost has been uprooted . . . stems directly from the fact that the form 
of the battle in Amona has presented the military and the police with an 
intolerable price-tag.”27 The experience has “deterred the military and police 
establishment,”28 Ariel wrote. He called for “leveraging the Amona events” 
to prevent them from reoccurring.29 
That was exactly what the “Hilltop Youth” did. They used the 
Amona lessons to escalate their deterrence campaign.30 
As a result, over the past four or five years, whenever Israeli mili-
tary and police officers arrived at a settlement or illegal outpost to carry out 
demolition orders, young local activists gathered to resist. If homes were 
demolished, settlers avenged the action by attacking Palestinian property or 
by disrupting traffic. At first, they also attacked police officers and soldiers, 
but before long, they focused on attacking Palestinians, a modus operandi 
that won them back significant support from the Israeli public. Physical 
attacks against soldiers and police officers continued, but were not the focus 
of the settlers’ resistance.  
  
 26 Uri Ariel, A Defeat That Is All Triumph, HATZOFE (Jan. 22, 2007), http://www.hazofe. 
co.il/web/newsnew/katava6.asp?Modul=24&id=54091&Word=&gilayon=2914&mador. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See CRISIS GRP. REP., supra note 21, at 11 (explaining the escalation of violence after 
Amona demolition). 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF PRICE TAG: FROM UNPOPULAR ANTI-
GOVERNMENT HIGH-PROFILE RESISTANCE TO POPULAR ANTI-
PALESTINIAN LOW-INTENSITY TERRORISM 
About a year after the Amona events, when the Olmert government 
launched a selective, timid initiative to demolish illegal structures in settle-
ments and outposts, the Hilltop Youth and other settler leaders organized 
efforts to resist. They called it “Mutual Responsibility” (in Hebrew, Arvut 
Hadadit: a term that denotes a Jewish value of caring for each other within 
the community).31 
The idea was prosaic, according to one of the Hilltop Youth’s lead-
ers. In an anonymous May 2011 interview with the Israeli daily YEDIOTH 
AHRONOTH, this leader explained that some families whose homes had been 
demolished were absent at the time of the demolition and were thus unable 
to resist.  
One evening, about three years ago, a few people sat in a small settlement 
in Samaria [the northern West Bank] and looked for a solution. The IDF 
would demolish settlement outposts without a response, because people 
simply weren’t able to reach the [sites slated for] evacuation. So for these 
people, who did not have the privilege to oppose the demolition, the con-
cept of “mutual responsibility” was born that evening, and later on, the 
media decided to call it the “price tag.”
32
  
At the time, the settlers’ resistance was mainly directed at IDF sol-
diers and Israeli police officers carrying out the demolition orders.
33
 Yitzhak 
Shadmi, the director of the Samaria Settlers’ Council, an umbrella body that 
represents the settlers of the northern West Bank, put it this way in a June 
2008 interview: “Dismantling is for us a crime. And if it is a crime it must 
be prevented.”34 In reference to the settlers’ traditional leaders who advo-
cated avoiding a confrontation with the government and its law enforce-
ment, he said: “Whoever is not preventing it is an accomplice. It is simple 
logic.”35 He added, “During the struggle, [the traditional leaders] decided 
that it was inappropriate to defeat the State and the IDF. We think that when 
the IDF gives orders that are inappropriate, it must be defeated.”36 Asked 
  
 31 Nathan Jeffay, Settlers Appear to Be Ramping up Violence in West Bank, 
FORWARD.COM (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.forward.com/articles/13991/. 
 32 Akiva Novick, At Any Cost, YEDIOTH AHRONOTH, May 13, 2011, at 22, translated in 
ISRAEL NEWS TODAY (May 16, 2011). 
 33 See CRISIS GRP. REP., supra note 21, at 29 (detailing the shifting focus of violence to the 
Israeli Defense Force and police).  
 34 Hagit Rothenberg, Decision Makers will Think Twice Before the Next Event, ISR. NAT’L 
NEWS (June 29, 2008), http://www.inn.co.il/Besheva/Article.aspx/7528.  
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
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about future plans, he said, “we will conduct a rough and piercing struggle, 
and not necessarily in the arena that they are thinking of. The arena will be 
[determined] according to our consideration.”37  
The settlers have always been sensitive to Israeli public criticism. 
When such criticism mounted, cognizant of their fellow Israelis’ low toler-
ance for attacks on the IDF, a people’s army, the settlers directed most of 
their attacks against Palestinians and their property.  
The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) in the West Bank has documented a total of 1,451 settlers’ attacks 
on Palestinians and their property since January 2006: physical attacks on 
Palestinians, attacks on vehicles, houses, schools and mosques, uprooting of 
trees, torching of fields, and more.38 Even if these attacks were not all part 
of “Price Tag,” many—probably most—were. The data show a sharp in-
crease since October 2009, when Prime Minister Netanyahu announced his 
intention to impose a ten-month long moratorium on settlement construction 
(the Israeli cabinet officially decided to approve Netanyahu’s decision in 
November 2009).39 
When government demolition attempts intensified, “Price Tag”-
related attacks soared accordingly:40 
 2006: 162 
 2007: 149 
 2008: 271 
 2009: 216 
 2010: 417 
 2011 (January–June): 236 
Methods of “Price Tag”-related attacks on Palestinians and their 
property vary. In most cases, they involve vandalism, damage to property, 
and typically light injuries to Palestinians. The perpetrators of “Price Tag” 
attacks have been careful to maintain a relatively low level of violence, al-
beit widespread. There are several reasons for Price Tag’s being a form of 
low-intensity terrorism: 
  
 37 Id. 
 38 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Monthly Humanitarian 
Monitor, UNISPAL (Sept. 2011), http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.nsf/47D4E277B48D9D36 
85256DDC00612265/D0920802FB6A50FF8525792E00514CDD. 
 39 Rep. of the Comm. on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, 
65th Sess, U.N. Doc. A/65/35; GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 35 (2010). 
 40 Data was especially aggregated by OCHA for this paper. U.N. Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs, Israeli Settler Related Incidents Leading to Casualties or Prop-
erty Damage: 2006–2011 (unpublished data) (on file with author). 
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 Maintaining a high level of Israeli popular support: Extreme vio-
lence might alienate the Israeli public. Low-intensity violence creates a 
“comfort zone” of sorts for Israelis, who often view such violence as a 
somewhat legitimate form of protest.  
 Avoiding accountability: Israel’s “Judea and Samaria” police district, 
responsible for law enforcement in the settlements, is understaffed and un-
der-equipped.
41
 It does not have the resources to investigate petty crime 
such as vandalism. Most Price Tag incidents do not end up with indict-
ments. For example, in 2008, 105 indictments were filed against Israeli ci-
vilians for attacking Palestinians and their property in the West Bank. In 
2007 the number of such indictments was sixty-one
.42
 
 Allowing room for escalation: Cumulative deterrence, the impact that 
the settlers are hoping to achieve through their Price Tag campaign, is best 
accomplished on a gradual scale of escalation. The use of limited force to 
avenge limited-scale house demolitions implies the potential use of greater 
force in retaliation for greater action.  
Israeli security officials reportedly estimate that several thousand 
young activists take part in the attacks.
 43 Young activists communicate 
through text messages on their mobile telephones.44 Typically, the attacks 
come in retaliation for the demolition of illegal structures in settlements or 
outposts, or to prevent such demolitions.  
In some cases, waves of attacks on Palestinians came in response to 
political developments, such as the November 2009 decision to freeze set-
tlement construction.
45
 In other cases, they came to avenge Palestinian ter-
rorist attacks on settlers, for example: the wave of attacks on Palestinians 
following the murder of five family members in the settlement of Itamar, 
  
 41 Shelly Paz & Abe Selig, Pines: Police Must Fight Settler Attacks, JERUSALEM POST 
(Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=116189 (explaining the defi-
ciencies with the police force in the Judea and Samaria districts). 
 42 Matthew Levitt & Becca Wasser, Violence by Extremists in the Jewish Settler Move-
ment: A Rising Challenge, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR E. POL’Y (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www. 
washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2967 (reporting trends and threats of vio-
lence in fringe settlements). 
 43 See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Unprotected: Israeli 
Settler Violence against Palestinian Civilians and Their Property, Dec. 2008 OCHA SPECIAL 
FOCUS 3 [hereinafter OCHA] (discussing Israeli media reports which credit the recent in-
crease in settler violence to “radicalized settler youth”). 
 44 See Chaim Levinson, Settlers Attack Palestinians to Avenge West Bank Outpost Demoli-
tion, HAARETZ.COM (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news 
/settlers-attack-palestinians-to-avenge-west-bank-outpost-demolition-1.262160 (describing 
how text messages are used to communicate with youth to carry out a “price-tag” operation).   
 45 See OCHA supra note 43, at 15 (giving an example of the “price-tag” techniques used 
in response to the dismantling of settlements).     
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near Nablus, in March 2011.46 That month set a record: seventy-nine “Price 
Tag” attacks in one month, according to OCHA data, the highest number of 
attacks in one month since October 2010.47 
A public opinion poll published on March 28, 2011—as “Price 
Tag” attacks soared and the Israeli public was still feeling the effect of the 
Itamar attack—showed that almost half of the Israeli public (46%) was sup-
portive of “Price Tag” tactics.48 While 48% said “Price Tag” attacks were 
unjustified, 22% said the actions were “perfectly justified”, and 23% de-
fined them as “quite justified.”49 “While most [secular Israelis Jews] said 
they opposed ‘[P]rice [T]ag’ activities (36% in favor, 57% against), most 
traditional, national-religious and ultra-Orthodox Jews believe these actions 
are justified (55%, 70% and 71%, respectively).”50 
In other words, among the settlers’ natural constituency of national-
religious and ultra-Orthodox Israeli Jews, a solid majority expressed support 
for the tactic. But even among secular Israeli Jews, more than a third ex-
pressed support.  
It is entirely possible, if not likely, that the timing of the poll influ-
enced the respondents’ views. Israelis were still under the influence of the 
horror of five family members, including young children, having been mas-
sacred in their beds on a Sabbath.51 But even if one accounts for the impact 
of the outrage, such significant support for violent actions against innocent 
Palestinian civilians means that the settlers achieved an important goal. 
They avoided alienating a large majority of the Israeli public and galvanized 
significant support among their natural constituency. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Israel’s security establishment has been wrestling for years with the 
challenge of deterring Palestinian terrorism, with some success. It has also 
  
 46 See Harriet Sherwood, Five Members of Jewish Family Killed in Suspected Palestinian 
Militant Attack, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 
2011/mar/12/west-bank-jewish-family-killed (reporting that a Jewish family was killed near 
the Palestinian city of Nablus). 
 47 March Overview, THE MONTHLY HUMANITARIAN MONITOR (OCHA, East Jerusalem), 
Mar. 21, 2011, at 4, available at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_human 
itarian_monitor_2011_04_12_english.pdf (reporting the statistics surrounding Israeli at-
tacks).  
 48 Poll: 46% in Favor of ‘Price Tag,’ YNETNEWS.COM (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.ynet 
news.com/articles/0,7340,L-4048459,00.html (detailing the results of a poll conducted about 
Jewish beliefs on extremist actions against Palestinians).   
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See Sherwood, supra note 46 (referring to the murder of a family of five in a suspected 
Palestinian militant attack). 
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made a point of not allowing Palestinian terrorists to use the threat of terror-
ism to thwart or curtail Israel’s freedom of action politically. In other words, 
it has always worked to deny terrorists the ability to achieve a “balance of 
deterrence.”  
The settlers’ Price Tag strategy has succeeded where Palestinian 
terrorism has failed. It has successfully influenced the Israeli political and 
security establishment’s short term decision-making and its long term calcu-
lations. In the short term, it has deterred Israeli law enforcement authorities 
from keeping its international commitments, enforcing the law, and demol-
ishing structures built in violation of Israeli law.  
In the long term, the Price Tag campaign serves the settlers’ goal of 
building cumulative deterrence. By sowing fears of escalation among the 
Israeli public and government, it serves to deter them from acting to achieve 
an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement that would require removing settlers 
from the West Bank en mass. Israelis, including senior officials, often ex-
press some version of the following notion: “If removing a handful of build-
ings from an illegal outpost sets the settlers off on an uncontrollable ram-
page, just imagine how bad it’ll be if the government signs a peace agree-
ment and commits to removing tens of thousands of settlers from scores of 
settlements.”52 
In November of 2008, in the wake of a wave of settlers’ attacks 
against Palestinians, the head of Israeli’s internal security service, the Shin 
Bet, again briefed the Israeli cabinet on the radicalization among young 
West Bank settlers. According to Israeli journalist Alex Fishman (known to 
have extensive contacts within Israel’s security establishment), Shin-Bet 
Head Yuval Diskin told the Cabinet (as paraphrased by Fishman): 
If you don't intend to wield governmental authority and enforce the law 
without blinking, then don’t mess with them, because you will only light 
unnecessary bonfires. If you don't seriously intend to remove them, then 
you are powerless to deal with their hooliganism against the Palestinians; 
don't play into their hands. They are serious. They will yet fire at police, at 




 52 See Glenn Kessler & Howard Schneider, U.S. Urges Israel to End Expansion, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/05/23/ 
AR2009052301536_pf.html (reasoning why settlements cannot be dismantled); see also 
Netanyahu Says Settlements Can Expand, BBC NEWS (May 24, 2009), http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/middle_east/8066389.stm (explaining why Israeli settlements will be allowed to 
expand). 
 53 Alex Fishman, Beware the Radical Right: Only a Pretext for Murder is Lacking, 
YEDIOTH AHRONOTH, Nov. 3, 2008, at  9, translated in ISRAEL NEWS TODAY (Nov. 3, 2008); 
see also Aluf Benn, Settlers Preparing for War, Says Shin Bet Chief, HAARETZ.COM (Nov. 2, 
2011), http://www.haaretz.com/news/settlers-preparing-for-war-says-shin-bet-chief-1.2564 
73 (summarizing security chief Yuval Diskin’s meeting with Israeli cabinet ministers). 
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In so saying, Diskin captured the impact of the settlers’ successful 
campaign of deterrence. The Israeli government indeed got the message, 
and has acted accordingly. Although the government has continued over the 
past three years to evict or demolish illegally built structures in settlements 
and outposts, it has done so piecemeal, and very selectively. It has not de-
molished any of the 100-odd illegal outposts that have popped up through-
out the West Bank over the past decade or so, and it has not cracked down 
decisively on the Price Tag perpetrators. Thus it has neither reversed their 
achievement of effective deterrence, nor prepared the ground for removal of 
illegal outposts in the future. It certainly has not created an environment 
necessary for removing settlements in the context of a future peace agree-
ment.  
Price Tag is a success story. It is the success of an illegal, terrorist 
strategy aimed at perpetuating illegal construction and land grabs, and limit-
ing the political maneuverability of future Israeli governments, should they 
seek to achieve a peace agreement with the Palestinians. 
 
